

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 3 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. GODBER

(United Kingdom)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUNCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. de A. ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. K. CHRISTOV  
Mr. V. PALINE  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG  
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. GEBRE-EGZY  
Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. C.K. GAIRCLA  
Mr. M.B. NAIR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI-OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. S. GONZALEZ GALVEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. T. WISNIEWSKI  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. T. MANOLIU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN  
Mr. H. BLIX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. S.H. McINTYRE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the fourteenth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): Like many speakers yesterday, I must express my delegation's disappointment and deep concern at the fact that the last stage of talks in the Sub-Committee of the three Powers on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests does not seem to have resulted in one step forward towards a positive settlement of this urgent issue. We have studied the verbatim records of the Sub-Committee's meetings and we listened attentively to the statements made yesterday by two of the participants in the talks, as well as by several other members of the Committee. Permit me briefly to state our position on this problem.

Many speakers have stressed the urgency of the question we are facing. Why is it so urgent today? It is -- and we are all fully aware of this -- because not only the negotiations of the Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear tests but also the deliberations of the Eighteen Nation Committee have found themselves under the pressure of a certain fact. This fact has occurred independently and irrespective of the resolution of the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly defining the task and the agenda of our Committee [1722 (XVI)]. I have in mind the decision of the Government of the United States, supported by the Government of the United Kingdom, to carry out, in addition to the underground tests, a new series of nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere. This decision was made public a few days before the Committee started its work. It may be said to be tantamount to direct pressure on our deliberations on the part of the Western Powers. How else could we characterize the fact that the statement on the resumption of tests fixed the time for the tests to be conducted as the latter part of April, unless by that time an agreement had been signed on the cessation of test explosions, in the conditions stated by the Western Powers? It is not, therefore, a question of the development of the technical and scientific aspects of the problem; rather it is a political factor -- it is unilateral action on the part of the Western Powers which is placing the Conference in such a difficult situation and making its task so complicated.

The Western Powers have tried to prove that the main problem here is the question of international control; many speeches have been made in this sense both in our plenary meetings and in the Sub-Committee. Yesterday we listened with

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

attention to an elaborate speech by the representative of the United States. Although he was invoking methods of science and technology, his arguments did not sound convincing to us. Technology and science have made such a big advance that all types of detonations, including those underground, may now be reliably detected. Anyway, practically all nuclear explosions carried out since the end of the Second World War, and in particular since 1949, have been detected by national control systems. This applies likewise to the underground explosions of nuclear weapons. This was again confirmed at the beginning of February this year, when the United States control system recorded an underground explosion carried out in the Soviet Union with the very purpose of proving the possibility of controlling underground nuclear tests with the existing instruments.

Apart from this, the signing of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests would be of such importance, and the consequences ensuing from its violation for the respective country would be so far-reaching, that to speak about a violation of the agreement by clandestine explosions is purely hypothetical. This became even more apparent yesterday, when the representative of Italy tried, rather artificially and in a purely speculative way, to build up such a theoretical case of violation.

I would like to refer once again to the proposal submitted by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan on 3 September last year [GEN/DNT/120], which to us is further proof that even the representatives of the Western Powers at the highest level confirm the possibility of effective control of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests by the existing national detection systems.

Yesterday the representative of the United States told us that by admitting the possibility of control by national systems the Western Powers then were prepared "to run certain risks." They were willing "to contemplate an atmospheric test ban which would, in part at least, be controlled by existing monitoring systems", in order "to prevent a new, ascending spiral of testing by all sides in the nuclear arms race." (ENDC/PV.13, page 23)

This alleged risk could not have been so great if we take into consideration all that was said about the positive possibility of controlling a test ban agreement by the existing national systems; and the responsible statesmen of the West were certainly fully aware of it. But admitting, for the sake of argument, that it meant running a certain risk in September 1961, what is the difference between then and now? Is there not an even more urgent necessity now than in

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

September 1961 "to prevent a new, ascending spiral of testing by all sides in the nuclear arms race", as the United States called it? Many speakers stressed this necessity yesterday. Does not the scope of the necessity make it worth running another risk, as the United States delegation calls it? Or was it worth running this risk only when the Soviet tests -- which, by the way, were necessitated by the provocative policies of Western belligerent circles -- were to be stopped, and is it not now worth running the risk when United States tests are involved? This is a question which it is certainly necessary to answer.

The Soviet delegation has several times pointed to the fact that the demands for the establishment of the so-called international control system are made only to bring about conditions that would make it possible to gain important information of an espionage character in the territory of the Soviet Union. Mr. Dean in his speech yesterday attempted to minimize these justified and well-founded apprehensions, but he did not succeed. How could he, if he took account of the many pronouncements of United States political and military leaders who have said openly that they consider spying in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as their main task? Permit me to quote only a few sentences from one United States official publication, "Developments in Military Technology and their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy", published in the series "United States Foreign Policy" by the United States Government Printing Office. On page 51 of that publication there is a quotation from a pronouncement by the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Thomas D. White, who gave this summary of his target intelligence:

"We do know where their major air bases are; where their major Government control centres are; where their air defence centres are; where their sensitive industrial targets are; where their gasoline refineries and storage sites are; so on that basis we have accurate knowledge of the targets. The problem of locating missile sites is before us, and it is going to be a very difficult problem."

That was the pronouncement made by General White in the House hearings on the defence budget for the fiscal year 1960. Of course, the same circles which are so eager for these espionage targets are pressing for international control and, at the same time, for another series of nuclear tests. These facts are noted not only by us in the socialist countries, but even by objective Western commentators.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

I should like to refer in this connexion to a well-known scientific authority in your country, Mr. Chairman: Professor P.M.S. Blackett, who on 2 March wrote in the New Statesman a very interesting article which perhaps some of our colleagues have seen. May I be allowed to quote from this article a few sentences which justify the preoccupations with the espionage possibilities offered by the so-called international control system? Referring to the draft treaty submitted by the Western Powers in 1961, Professor Blackett said:

"If a detailed study of this document is made, it is clear that the process of setting up and operating the proposed international inspection system might conceivably have served to reveal the location of some, at least, of the Soviet missile sites. At any rate, it would be very hard to convince a military staff officer of any nationality that this possibility was negligible."

Having in mind what the scientific authorities in the West are saying, we find it very difficult to believe the contrary, as Mr. Dean has tried to make us do.

The fact that it is not a question of control at all which is involved is also attested to by statements of a number of official personalities in the United States, who urgently demand that the United States should carry out nuclear tests which would help it gain superiority in the field of nuclear weapons. The decision to conduct these tests has been made and intensive preparations for them are now under way, irrespective of the scientific and technological reasons that were invoked here yesterday. It follows from all those facts that the core of the solution of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests lies not in the scientific and technical aspects of control but in the exclusively political question of willingness and goodwill to come to an agreement. In the opinion of my delegation, the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is a problem which can be solved within a short time. However, this calls for all the negotiating parties to be guided by a desire to achieve a mutually-acceptable agreement which would not provide for unilateral advantages for any of the States parties to the agreement.

In discussing this question, as in discussing all other problems inscribed on the agenda of this Conference, we must proceed, in the opinion of my delegation, from the basic principles to be observed by the Committee which were adopted at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. However, in contradiction to those principles, the Western Powers try to press such proposals as would give them unilateral advantages and seriously jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.



(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations of 20 September 1961, which has been quoted here many times, calls on States "to refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions" (ENDC/5).

It is beyond doubt that the decision to conduct nuclear weapon test explosions announced by the Government of the United States is not in accordance with this provision. The carrying out of nuclear tests in the atmosphere inevitably would have very unfavourable consequences for the international atmosphere in general, and would in particular complicate our further deliberations. This rightly raises a question which was not answered by Mr. Dean in his speech yesterday. That question is: Why does the United States Government, which, as is well known, has so far conducted far more nuclear tests than the Soviet Union -- almost twice as many, according to the figures reported by the Western Press -- deem it necessary at the present time, when talks are being conducted on general and complete disarmament, to start carrying out a new series of tests the consequences of which may have a serious impact not only on the deliberations of this Conference, but also on the development of the international situation in general?

The negative consequences have recently been pointed out many times in the Committee as well as by public opinion. I should like to quote a pronouncement which the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Green -- whom we all know because of his attendance at this Conference -- made upon his return to Canada, as reported by the Journal de Genève of 31 March 1962: "Any resumption of nuclear tests by the United States would be a step backward for the disarmament negotiations."

On the other hand, the discontinuance of tests would have an immediate favourable impact not only on the future work of the Committee, but also on the general development of the situation. This was aptly expressed, for example, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Fawzi, in his intervention at the sixth meeting of the Committee on 21 March, when he said:

"The main thing is that the tests should actually be stopped. The world would not forgive us and we should not forgive ourselves if we allowed any more tests under any pretext and for any reason whatsoever to take place again."

(ENDC/PV.6, page 13)

Is the situation really as hopeless as certain voices have been trying to present it? We believe it is not, and many speakers yesterday supported this view. Several realistic proposals that have been submitted would make it possible to

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arrive at an early, mutually-acceptable agreement. The settlement of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests in principle would, of course, be facilitated by reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. Not only the question of the cessation of tests but all questions connected with control would then be settled within its framework.

In addition to these proposals, there are other proposals which would provide for the discontinuance of tests before the attainment of the agreement on general and complete disarmament. I have in mind in particular the proposal of the Soviet Union of 27 November 1961 /ENDC/117, which envisages the cessation of all tests, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to be controlled by the existing national control instruments, and a moratorium on all underground tests until agreement has been reached on the establishment of an appropriate control system within the framework of general and complete disarmament. This proposal takes into account the position of the Western Powers, which regard the question of underground nuclear tests -- and this position was stressed once again yesterday -- as the main problem. Therefore the Government of the Soviet Union has proposed that underground tests should not be included in the treaty on the banning of all tests until a control system has been established within the framework of general and complete disarmament, and that a moratorium should be declared on them.

We appreciate with sympathy the effort on the part of neutral countries to attain an immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests, an effort reflected yesterday in the statements of several representatives, in particular the representatives of Burma, Ethiopia and India. We associate ourselves with their appeal not to admit an impasse in the work of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

We feel that it would be useful at least to adopt the suggestion made in the first few days of the work of the Conference by the delegation of India, and supported by the delegation of Burma /ENDC/PV.5, p.37, to the effect that all nuclear Powers should refrain from carrying out any tests during the Committee's deliberations. This would be, I am sure, an important contribution to the effort to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament in the shortest time, and thus also to solve definitively the problem of nuclear tests.

It is evident that there is a way out of the present situation, but one thing is necessary: all delegations must exert true efforts to bring about the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in order to create the most favourable conditions for the work of our Committee and for the improvement of the international situation in general.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic has already had occasion to outline, among other things, my Government's views on the suspension of nuclear weapon tests. I do not wish, therefore, to burden the Committee with a repetition of the ideas and statements on the subject which have already been heard from the various speakers who have preceded me.

It was gratifying, however, to see from the very beginning of our meetings that our co-Chairmen were in agreement, at least on the immediacy and urgency of this problem. In so agreeing, they were echoing the world's most urgent and common desire to see an end to the suicidal race in atomic testing.

President Kennedy's words to his Secretary of State, which were read out to us at the second meeting of our Committee and which directed him "to seek as a matter of highest priority agreement on a safeguarded nuclear test ban", are still fresh in our memory /ENDC/PV.2, p.16/.

The representatives of a score and more of non-aligned States, representing hundreds of millions of human beings, at Belgrade in September 1961 again echoed the fervent desires of that great mass of humanity when they called upon the nuclear Powers to put an end to testing.

Such are the desires, the expectations and the hopes which humanity has today pinned on our Conference. It is therefore an understatement to say that we should spare no efforts to prevent a new series of atomic clouds, this time coming from United States tests, to be followed shortly thereafter by a Soviet rejoinder of perhaps still another bigger cloud, from overshadowing our Conference and casting their evil spell over our work here.

Mr. Fawzi remarked in his statement, and I wish to repeat it now with all the power of persuasiveness at my command, that: "The world would not forgive us and we should not forgive ourselves if we allowed any more tests under any pretext and for any reason whatsoever to take place again." (ENDC/PV.6, page 13)

I wish also to put on record my agreement with an idea expressed in our Conference recently by the Secretary of State of the United States. He said: "We do not believe that we would perform any service to the world or to our work if we attempted to conceal difficulties and issues for the sake of a false appearance of harmony." /ENDC/PV.10, page 5/.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

In the same spirit I may say that it would not do our work here any good to ignore the existence of political problems which do not happen to be within the scope of our Committee's terms of reference but which, unfortunately, have a direct bearing on the accomplishment of our task. Perhaps we should therefore appeal to the nuclear Powers to direct their efforts towards the elimination of the reasons for some of their most urgent and key political problems concurrently with their attempts to reach an agreement on a test ban treaty. This may even lead to and facilitate the reaching of such a settlement.

We know, as our Foreign Minister rightly pointed out, that: "The whole question is connected with vital matters of security, principally the security of two limited groups or a few States. But what about the survival and the security and the rights of the entire human race?" /ENDC/PV.6, page 13/

It is readily recognizable by one and all that at this stage in international relations no single measure within the scope of the work of this Conference would be more conducive to the improvement of the political atmosphere and to the alleviation of tensions and the betterment of our chances of success in the general field of disarmament than the conclusion of a test ban treaty.

Conversely, and regrettably, we cannot fail to foresee the ill effects on world public opinion, on our disarmament negotiations and on the international atmosphere that failure to arrive at a test ban treaty would have.

To recognize the difficulties of the problem as well as its political intricacies does not mean that we surrender to despair or that we acknowledge that we have come to the end of human resourcefulness. Difficulties exist to be ceaselessly tackled, repeatedly thrashed out and finally conquered.

There is no dearth of proposals or plans for a test ban treaty which, according to the best knowledge and sincere beliefs of their proponents, can lead to an agreement safeguarding legitimate considerations of security, although some party might hesitate to accept them for some reason or other. At this stage, however, we prefer to trust that the spirit which inspired the Soviet Union-United States Joint Statement of Agreed Principles may still prove to be the best means of guiding their steps towards a mutually-agreed settlement. We should all find encouragement and renewed hope in the thought that the prize is well worth our efforts.

In the light of the foregoing we find it a source of genuine hope that the nuclear Powers have agreed to continue their talks tomorrow.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

My delegation has studied carefully the verbatim records of the meetings of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. They contain an elaborate presentation of the positions of the three nuclear Powers. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that the future talks will lay more emphasis on studies of the ways and means of reconciling their positions, in line with the task of the Sub-Committee as defined by the Chairman of its first meeting on 21 March. He rightly stated:

" ... we three have been sent here with a specific task to perform, to try and make progress in relation to our respective positions in this matter." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.1, page 10-11)

Finally, it is our hope that the forthcoming meetings of the Sub-Committee will report such progress, and that it will give careful consideration to the ideas and proposals which were contained in the statements made yesterday by the representatives of Burma and Sweden and which were supported by the representatives of India and Ethiopia.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): I should like to deal with the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, one of the most important problems being discussed by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. The position of the Romanian Government is well known. It stands for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water, in outer space and underground.

The three-Power Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests has informed our Committee that after almost three weeks of negotiations the participating States have not made any progress.

The Romanian delegation has noted this with regret. All peoples are expecting that the proceedings devoted to the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests should lead to real progress, which should be incorporated in a treaty.

Our delegation is fully aware that the Sub-Committee is working in the shadow of a bad omen. At the beginning of March the United States Government announced its decision to resume nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere.

At the time we proposed the setting up of a sub-committee of the three great nuclear Powers for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, we thought that both parties would tackle the problem with all the seriousness required by the situation we are now facing. We also thought that both parties were animated by the sincere wish to seek every possibility of preventing the resumption of nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Unfortunately, however, while talks are being held in Geneva, the United States newspaper The New York Herald Tribune is writing:

"The American tests are going to be renewed without any kind of delay in spite of the pressure of the neutralists or because of elements of propaganda ..."

Furthermore, commenting on the answer given by President Kennedy at a Press Conference on 29 March to a question concerning the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the United States of America, The New York Times wrote on 30 March:

"The Presidential statement seems to have a two-fold purpose ..."

and I quote the second:

"The second was to lay the basis for resumption of atmospheric testing in the event that no agreement could be reached in the next weeks".

If we are to believe these two important United States newspapers, it would seem that everything has been arranged beforehand and that the discussions within the three-Power Sub-Committee will therefore be useless.

Events, however, must not develop in that way, and I am convinced that no one in this Conference has weakened in his decision to make efforts so that an agreement may be reached.

However, frankly speaking, this requires the Western nuclear Powers to tackle the problem from a new angle. During yesterday's meeting I listened attentively to the ample statement of the representative of the United States of America, and I was particularly interested in that part referring to the presentation of the international control system, as well as in the part concerning the criticism of national control.

I sincerely confess that the Romanian delegation was not convinced by the arguments put forward by Mr. Dean. The representative of the United States of America asserted that the problem of control, which in the minds of the Western nuclear Powers stands at the centre of things, is a technical, not a political, problem. But is that so? Facts show the contrary. On 3 September 1961, shortly before the Soviet Union began nuclear weapon tests, the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, proposed in a letter to the Premier of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, that control of the observance of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere should be achieved with the help of existing means, thus attesting to the efficiency of national control.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

What has happened since to make the United States of America and the United Kingdom change their stand on the very eve of the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the United States Government?

Wishing to explain the stand of the United States of America and the United Kingdom taken in the letter of 3 September 1961, the representative of Great Britain -- and I refer to you, Mr. Chairman -- pointed out that at that time the two nuclear Powers, in their wish to arrive at an agreement, had decided to run a certain risk.

I have duly appreciated this explanation; but why was this theory of risk valid on the eve of the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the Soviet Union, and why is it no longer valid now, when the United States of America is preparing to carry out nuclear weapon tests and when it could certainly help in promoting the proceedings of our Committee?

Nobody denies the need of control as concerns the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. But if on 3 September 1961 there was no need of international control because the existing means of detection were adequate -- as is stated in the Kennedy-Macmillan letter, there is even less need of an international control now. The means of detection and identification have improved and are constantly improving, and this permits us to assert that efficient control can be carried out by using national means only.

On the other hand, we must stress that the method of national control presents the great advantage of excluding the very idea of the collection of military information -- for which international control creates indisputable possibilities. This greatly helps to improve international relations, to remove suspicion and thus to establish an atmosphere necessary to successfully tackle the great issues which today face us on the international plane.

I would like to draw attention to another aspect of the problem. During the three years when the moratorium between the nuclear Powers was in force, no nuclear weapon tests were carried out and no international control was exerted. Although there was no treaty, no government ever manifested any suspicion that others were secretly carrying out such tests. There existed the minimum of confidence necessary to any understanding. Neither individual nor States can come to an agreement if there is no mutual confidence that obligations assumed will be respected.

(Mr. Măcevescu, Romania)

A long time ago the principle of pacta sunt servanda was formulated as an urgent necessity in relations among States. It imposes itself even more today, when mankind has covered important historical stages in its development and has reached a certain level of civilization. Governments are compelled to respect the treaties concluded, because otherwise they would be subjected to the scorn and wrath of their own people -- nay, of all peoples.

The Romanian delegation has noted that, in order to reach a satisfactory solution concerning a ban on nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Government has made particular efforts throughout the years. It is the sincere wish of the Romanian delegation that the Western Powers show goodwill and give up their old stand, which is unacceptable to the other party.

An old English proverb says: "Where there is a will there is a way". We are convinced that the United States of America and the United Kingdom can and must find a way to change their stand so as to permit the achievement of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties concerned.

World opinion, profoundly worried by the intention manifested by the United States Government to resume nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, with all the implications this would have, insists on the necessity of an agreement being reached in the shortest possible time.

The Romanian delegation, deeply convinced that the Soviet proposals are realistic, that they offer a possibility of urgently concluding an agreement, and that they satisfy the legitimate interests of all parties concerned, and being conscious of the responsibility incumbent on our Committee and first of all on the nuclear Powers, stands for the continuation of the proceedings of the Sub-Committee so that a definitive discontinuation of nuclear weapon tests may be achieved as soon as possible.

This work should be carried out with patience and a great sense of responsibility. This is a problem on the solution of which depends to a great extent the achievement of a new international climate, so much desired by the entire world.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): The position of the United Nations General Assembly -- in other words, of world opinion -- on the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and of



(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

the obligation of States to refrain from resuming them, and on the related problem of the urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests under effective international control, is known to everyone and is on record in the resolutions adopted on 6 and 8 November 1961 [1648, 1649 (XVI)].

The first of these resolutions urges the States concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests and expresses confidence that the States concerned will reach agreement as soon as possible on the cessation of tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, under appropriate international control.

The second resolution, recognizing that a permanent and continuing cessation of nuclear weapons testing would be guaranteed only by an effective and impartial system of verification in which all States have confidence, reaffirms that it is urgently necessary to reach an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests under effective control which would be a first step towards reversing the dangerous and burdensome arms race, would inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, would contribute to the reduction of international tensions and would eliminate any health hazards associated with nuclear testing.

My Government, like the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, supported both resolutions.

Over the years, whenever this problem has been discussed, Mexico has clearly expressed its position regarding nuclear weapons tests in various international forums and especially in the General Assembly.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country recently reaffirmed our position in the statement he made to this Committee on 22 March, when he said:

"We are opposed to nuclear tests for military purposes wherever and in whatever circumstances they may be carried out." (ENDC/PV.7, page 3)

In accordance with this policy of Mexico, I made the following statement on behalf of my delegation at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly:

"We are opposed to nuclear weapon tests wherever they are carried out because radioactive fallout causes serious harm to present and future generations and because the effects of such fallout extend beyond the national territory of the State setting off the explosions and affect foreign territory, presenting a serious danger to the health of other peoples and to mankind in general."

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

The question of the cessation of nuclear tests arises with dramatic urgency. The argument that the resumption of nuclear tests by one side is the inevitable reply to the military preparations or test explosions carried out by the other side affords no consolation to mankind and convinces nobody. What everyone is concerned about is the explosion itself and its effects.

A nuclear tests race between the Powers may perhaps be explained as an attempt to maintain a balance of power between them, but this military and political explanation has no moral justification. World opinion condemns the concrete fact of nuclear tests and their terrible effects on the health of mankind, irrespective of the military reasons given for carrying them out.

Public opinion, I repeat, makes no distinction between the dangers of nuclear weapon explosions set off by one side or by the other. It is no consolation for a man to die by the hand of his friend rather than of his enemy; what he wants is to live.

It is difficult to understand how disarmament negotiations can continue while a competition in nuclear explosions is going on. We do not think that any progress can be made in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament without first discontinuing nuclear explosions and guaranteeing, by means of a contractual obligation and adequate international control, that such tests will never be resumed.

We have listened to and very carefully considered the views expressed by the representatives of the nuclear Powers, as well as the arguments by which they support their respective positions. We realize that in the last analysis a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear tests cannot be kept in force by coercive measures. There could be only two kinds of sanction for the violation of such a treaty: (a) the moral condemnation of public opinion, and (b) the reprisal consisting in the fact that the other side would be freed from the obligation it had contracted.

Unless we rely on good faith and respect for contracted obligations, no method or system of verification will guarantee the effectiveness of such a treaty. But it is essential to recognize that a system of minimum verification is necessary to overcome suspicion and to promote an atmosphere of mutual trust. The acceptance of a minimum of international control might help to create a favourable climate for carrying out such a complicated and difficult task as disarmament.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

The idea of minimum international control has been justified by the need to identify suspicious seismic phenomena when it cannot be determined whether they are due to natural causes or to an explosion.

The disagreement, as it appears from the statements we have heard, centres on the ability or inability of national detection systems to identify the nature of the phenomena recorded. The Soviet Union says: "National means are sufficient." The United States and the United Kingdom say: "The existing instruments may be able to record a seismic phenomenon, but they cannot identify it, and inspection is necessary to settle doubtful cases."

Since this is the matter in dispute, it would seem logical to conclude that both sides should submit to the decision of a third party, which would be an international scientific body called upon to examine the data, the instruments and the results of national observations supplied by the different countries. After examining the data and reports furnished by the nuclear Powers in support of their respective arguments, the international scientific body would decide whether one statement or the other was scientifically correct. Once the opinion of an international scientific body had been obtained, negotiations could be resumed in the light of the impartial opinion of that body.

Another suggestion which might be considered -- as the Swedish delegation so aptly pointed out /ENDC/PV.13/ -- is to agree that in cases of doubt as to the true nature and origin of a phenomenon recorded by the various national stations, an international scientific body may apply to the government of the country in whose territory the epicentre of the recorded phenomenon was situated for additional reports and data, which would be confirmed by direct observation carried out by that body. This would be a form of minimum international control which should be politically unobjectionable and would preserve every Government against unjustified doubts or suspicions due to error, confusion or inefficiency in the observations provided through international co-operation in the recording of seismic phenomena.

I do not think that the emphasis should be solely on the scientific aspect of minimum of international control. Acceptance of the principle of a minimum of international verification would also have important political and psychological repercussions. It would provide a guarantee against unjustified doubts and suspicions and would help create an atmosphere of mutual trust which would facilitate progress in the various stages of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

No one can deny that mutual distrust, fear and doubt exist. Consequently, until there is a change it will be difficult to dispense with a minimum of international control. Suspicions of espionage and of clandestine violations may or may not be justified, but they are a political reality.

I should like to make it clear that the sole purpose of the observations made by my delegation is to offer our co-operation, modest though it may be, in carrying out the highly important task which has been entrusted to all the members of this Committee. We have listened with the greatest interest to the views of previous speakers and we consider that the suggestions made with a view to contributing to the solution of the problem before us should be carefully studied by the three nuclear Powers forming the Sub-Committee.

On 22 March the Sub-Committee appointed to study a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests submitted an interim report to this Committee in which it "regrets that it is not possible to report progress towards a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests" ENDC/107.

We have examined the records of the meetings held by the Sub-Committee up to the present, and have noted the reiteration, on several occasions, of the positions originally taken and the difficulties which are preventing agreement. The Sub-Committee will continue its efforts to reach an understanding. Its intention to do so, which we are sure is sincere, keeps our hopes alive; but we believe that continuation of the Sub-Committee's meetings will not in itself be sufficient to achieve satisfactory results unless it is accompanied by a new approach or a new attitude on the part of the negotiators.

If the Sub-Committee is not willing to introduce a new element into its discussions which will enable it to adopt less rigid positions, what will be the practical, positive result of the offer to continue these discussions? If its members continue to assert their respective points of view and to emphasize the differences which divide them, will that perhaps lead them to abandon positions which have hitherto been opposed or irreconcilable and which each side considers to be a sine qua non for the signing of a treaty prohibiting nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapon tests? It is to be feared that, on the contrary, the constant repetition and defence of conflicting views will rather tend to make their respective positions more rigid and inflexible. It is obvious that the solution does not depend on the Sub-Committee's continuing its meetings, but on both sides being willing and able to introduce new ideas or elements and move away from their present positions.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

What is, what should be, the role of the other members of this Committee? Should we resign ourselves to being impotent witnesses of the static attitude of the Sub-Committee or should we ask its members to abandon their respective positions and pay heed to the cry of the man in the street who needs and is calling for an agreement that will restore his peace of mind and permit further progress to be made towards the preservation of peace by the only means possible, namely, by stopping the arms race as a prior condition for the fruitful continuation of efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament?

We think the Sub-Committee should ask the members of this Committee for concrete suggestions and give them serious consideration. If, unfortunately, an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests is not concluded soon, the arms race will be given a tremendous impetus and new chain reactions will be started, the outcome of which no one can foretell. The arms race can have only one outcome: war.

There are some who think that by the end of June, when the nuclear Powers have satisfied their thirst or their need for further nuclear tests, efforts to conclude a treaty prohibiting such tests will be resumed. If that were so, it would mean that by July the nuclear Powers would be prepared to stop insisting on the conditions they now respectively demand for the signing of such a treaty and would then abandon the rigid positions they now maintain.

We believe that if it is considered possible for the nuclear Powers to find areas of agreement which will enable them to change their positions after new series of explosions have been set off, there is all the more reason why they should be able to do so now, before new series of tests are carried out. If in four months' time the nuclear Powers will be able to abandon the conditions they now consider indispensable for the conclusion of a treaty, it would be even easier for them to do so now, before each of them proceeds to exercise ad infinitum what it considers to be its right of reply to the explosions set off by the other side.

Both sides claim that tests are essential for maintaining the nuclear balance, for perfecting existing weapons of mass destruction, and for following the lure of anti-missile missiles and effective means of defence against a nuclear attack.

World opinion is reacting against this reasoning with increasing vigour as its purposes and objectives become clearer. Statesmen and government spokesmen of the opposing sides have repeatedly agreed that a nuclear war would mean the end of civilisation as we know it, the destruction of mankind and of life on this planet. We have been told that existing nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, and

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

the means and vehicles for delivering them on the chosen targets, are more than sufficient to wipe off the face of the earth absolutely everything worthy of existing on it: the wealth accumulated by the efforts, suffering and spirit of man through the ages from the beginning of his history. So what is the object of trying to improve existing weapons which are already so diabolically effective? Can man find consolation in the thought that weapons are being perfected to destroy him and that as a result of what is learned from nuclear tests these weapons will be increasingly deadly and destructive?

Man dies only once; mankind can be destroyed only once, and the weapons to do it already exist. World opinion is not convinced that the purpose of test explosions is to maintain or re-establish the nuclear balance; it fears that, on the contrary, what is being sought is disequilibrium and military advantage over the potential enemy. The greater the destructive power of the weapons, the greater will be the danger of war. In the present state of science there can be no permanent military advantage. Any supremacy in the field of nuclear warfare would be transitory and precarious. Any discovery made through the tests which would lead to the improvement of anti-missile missiles, or the production of weapons providing an absolute defence against nuclear attack, could precipitate war if it gave rise to the belief that an unquestionable advantage had been obtained over the enemy. Someone might have the evil dream that it was possible to destroy the enemy and survive. The day that idea was accepted by any government, nuclear war would be inevitable and with it the extinction of mankind.

Many years ago in the United Nations General Assembly, I stated my belief that nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons had imposed a common destiny on potential enemies: to live together or to die together. Since then, the progress of science and technology has given further evidence of the truth of this belief and has led to the universal conviction that the sine qua non for survival is mutual understanding and agreement. There is no possible way out of this dilemma, and no alternative will be found by repeating nuclear tests.

It is therefore essential that the Sub-Committee of the nuclear Powers should succeed in its negotiations. Its failure would have more serious consequences than we can now foresee. Time presses, the task is a long one, and opportunity will not wait. I hope we shall find it possible to fulfil our task before it is too late.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I should now like to make a few remarks in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom. In doing so I would like to say straight away that I have listened with great interest, as I am sure we all have, to the remarks of Mr. Padilla Nervo, whom we all know as such a distinguished representative of his country and, in particular, as someone who has taken a special interest in disarmament matters for so many years. I am sure we shall all want to study with great care what he has said. I shall hope to refer later in my remarks to one or two of the points he touched upon. I was also very interested in the other speeches which we have heard this morning and which have covered a wide area. In particular I found myself in agreement with a good deal of what the representative of the United Arab Republic had to say.

Yesterday we also had a valuable debate. I think it was particularly helpful to listen to the views of representatives of those countries which had not previously been engaged in detailed discussion on the test ban problem. Yesterday we heard a detailed, full and able explanation of the Western position in these negotiations from our United States colleague, Mr. Dean. I do not propose, therefore, to take the time of the Conference by going into great detail on the Western case. I would simply say that I agree in general with everything that Mr. Dean said. The United Kingdom and the United States have worked in close co-operation throughout the long and complicated negotiations for a test ban treaty, which began as long ago as 31 October 1958. Anybody who takes the time to study Mr. Dean's very full statement cannot but agree, I think, that the Western case is soundly based, reasonable and flexible. Today I shall try to put the issues and the points of difference between the two sides as succinctly and as clearly as I can, and I shall do so against the background of our discussion yesterday and of the comments that we have heard this morning.

What are the basic facts?

First, the 1958 Conference of Experts, which included representatives of four communist and four non-communist countries, agreed unanimously that the problem of detecting and identifying explosions entailed considerable difficulty, especially where explosions took place underground. They concluded, however, that, notwithstanding the great difficulty which might be experienced in obtaining positive identification of a carefully concealed underground nuclear explosion, there would always be a possibility of detection of such a violation by means of on-site inspection.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Further, the Conference of Experts concluded that it was technically feasible to establish, with the capabilities and limitations outlined in the report, a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. To satisfy its technical functions, the experts said, such a control system must be under the supervision of an appropriately constituted international control organ.

This, then, sums up in very simple terms what the 1958 Conference of Experts reached agreement on. Let me repeat that it was a report submitted unanimously by scientists representing four communist countries and four non-communist countries. In that connexion I must say that some of the arguments that we heard today from the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Romania did seem to come somewhat oddly from representatives of countries whose experts joined in compiling the recommendations for international verification in the 1958 expert's report /EXP/NUC/23/. It is all set down here in the report, and their experts in fact took full part in drawing up the report. I think one should bear that in mind.

This report was accepted and it was endorsed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, and these three Governments shortly thereafter agreed to send representatives to Geneva to begin negotiations for a test ban agreement on the basis of the report. I might recall here that in sending its representatives the Soviet Government stated "that the purpose of such a conference is to conclude an agreement on the permanent discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests by the States and to establish an appropriate control system for the enforcement of such an agreement" /A/3940/.

That was then the Soviet understanding of the position. They fully accepted the requirement of an appropriate control system for the enforcement of such an agreement. That was the basis, then, on which the Geneva Conference opened in October 1958, and for three years negotiations in that Conference continued on that basis. Throughout that period, the Soviet representatives consistently maintained that any departure from the basis, of the experts' report would be unacceptable. This is a fundamental point which cannot be stressed too much. For three years Soviet representatives maintained that the only basis for a nuclear test ban was the experts' report, and this report envisaged an international system of verification. Indeed, for those three years the Soviet representatives were arguing exactly as I am arguing at this moment, and I would venture to think that if they had maintained it, this position could be agreed by every delegation here today.



(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

It was on this basis that by early 1961 agreement had been reached on seventeen out of about twenty-four articles, and two annexes out of three, required for a nuclear test ban treaty. The negotiations had, of course, been long and difficult, but a treaty was in sight: At this stage the United States and the United Kingdom, in a desire to further the work of the Conference, tabled on 18 April 1961 a complete draft treaty incorporating all these agreed articles and the two agreed annexes /GEN/DNT/110/. There were, of course, still some outstanding issues, but those outstanding issues were not concerned with the principle of international supervision. They were concerned with the degree of that international supervision. They were not concerned with the question whether or not there should be international control posts on the territories of the nuclear Powers; they were concerned with how many control posts there should be. They were not concerned with whether there should be on-site inspection to identify events which might be suspected of being nuclear explosions; they were concerned with the number of on-site inspections which should be permitted in any one year.

At this stage, in putting forward their draft treaty, the United States and the United Kingdom said that their position was still completely flexible, and that their draft treaty was fully negotiable. We have maintained that flexibility ever since. One or two representatives have talked about the rigidity of the positions on both sides, but I do submit that the Western Powers have been flexible and are flexible today, and we will be only too glad to continue with that flexibility if we can see some move from the other side.

We have made constant efforts since that time to meet the Soviet Union wherever it has expressed objections to our proposals, save only that we wish to maintain the principle, for so long accepted by the Soviet Union, of a minimum of international verification. This point is something on which I must lay particular emphasis. Yesterday there were suggestions in the speeches of some of our colleagues that both sides were adopting these very rigid attitudes, but, as I say, this really is not the case.

I would repeat that we have put forward a number of proposals since we tabled our draft treaty designed to understand and to meet the Soviet objections. All our alternative proposals are for a system less rigorous and involving less inspection and less control than that recommended by the experts of both Western and communist countries in 1958. These experts proposed an international inspection of every unidentified event. This was the agreement between the two sides. We, for our part, proposed international inspection of, at the very most, one in every four or five of those detected events.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

In general, we have even gone so far as to say we would scrap all the work done at the Geneva Conference and start again from the beginning if the Soviet Union would accept the basic principle of a minimum of international verification. That was our position, and it is our position today.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand -- and I regret to have to say this, but one must speak frankly -- has been rigid and it is rigid today. To our great dismay, the Soviet reaction to our draft treaty was a categorical refusal to discuss any of its details. Soviet representatives since then have categorically refused to discuss a single one of our subsequent proposals. Worse than that, they have progressively withdrawn from some of the more important provisions on which agreement had previously been reached.

Finally, at the end of August 1961, the Soviet Union announced and carried out its huge series of tests. Then, on 27 November it submitted new proposals /ENDC/11/ which completely repudiated the whole basis on which the negotiations had been proceeding and which offered a treaty -- or agreement, as they called it -- embodying no form of international verification, no impartial check whatsoever, on the observance of the obligation not to test.

These are the melancholy facts. They cannot be gainsaid by anyone around this table. What are the reasons? Perhaps I could briefly recount some of them.

First, the Soviet representatives have argued that a new situation developed in the world last year which made it impossible for the Soviet Union to accept any element of an international control system on its territory. I must say that I really do find this an incomprehensible argument.

Mr. Zorin yesterday referred to the question of Berlin, but if East-West relations were exacerbated over the question of Berlin, I must say definitely that the responsibility for this lies at the door of the Soviet Union. I do not want to introduce arguments over Berlin here: We have enough problems without referring to that. But one must frankly accept that fact. Indeed, so far as we can see, nothing relevant had happened in the international situation except that the Soviet Government itself had resumed the race in nuclear testing. Surely that makes the need for a test ban with a minimum of international verification greater rather than less.

In the light of this, I really was frankly amazed that Mr. Zorin should say the following yesterday as he said in connexion with the Soviet test explosions:

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

"Thereupon, the United States and the United Kingdom lost all interest in the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and began to prepare a new series of nuclear tests: that is, they began to prepare a new spurt in the nuclear arms race."

(ENDC/PV.13, page 44)

This is an astonishing reversal of logic and a reversal of fact. I find it difficult to understand how Mr. Zorin can say such a thing seriously, because, as everyone round this table knows, it was the Soviet Union which started the new surge in the atomic arms race. It does seem to me that the Soviet Union should acknowledge, and acknowledge freely, the forbearance of the West in this respect. After all, there can be no doubt -- and this has been referred to by various representatives round the table -- that the Soviet Government did gain important knowledge from its series of tests, a series of tests which were of greater power than all other tests ever made by all other countries combined. The reply to the Soviet delegation's argument that there had been, in total, a larger number of tests by the other side is that the value and the volume of this last series of Soviet tests were greater by far. Yet in spite of that -- I do not want to dwell on this, we all know it well -- we are saying to them, "Keep your gains; we are still willing to sign a treaty now to ban all tests for ever, leaving the Soviet Union with the advantages that it may have gained from its last series of tests, and we are willing to do this provided only that the treaty does contain a minimum of safeguards".

Secondly, the Soviet Union says that international control posts and international inspection would amount to espionage. Yet one cannot get away from the fact that for three years, from 1958 to 1961 -- as far as we know, up until 28 November 1961 -- the Soviet Government was accepting the principle of international control. Presumably, therefore, during all that time the Soviet Union was prepared to accept this risk to which it refers. As I have said, the only relevant event to cause the Soviet Union to change its mind was its own series of tests.

Moreover, we have shown in our debates at this Conference that the risk of any espionage by members of the international system, as proposed in the Western draft treaty, is so small as to be negligible. Foreign members of control posts and inspection teams and foreign technicians on aircraft sampling flights over Soviet territory would be under constant supervision and in the closest contact

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

with Soviet technicians and observers. This point is really fundamental. I do not understand the Soviet attitude in this regard when one compares it with the attitude they put forward, sincerely I am sure, in regard to disarmament and in regard to measures related to disarmament. Now they say that they accept control only in the context of general and complete disarmament.

I should like for a moment to refer to a document which was distributed by the Soviet Union at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1961. In this document Mr. Gromyko put forward his eight points, as they were called. If one looks at the eighth point, namely "Steps to decrease the danger of surprise attack", one finds the following:

"The most practical steps which might be taken at an early date include the setting up of land control posts at railway junctions and major ports and on motor roads ..." ENDC/14, page 97.

This, in other words, accepts explicitly the proposition that there should be observers, international observers I presume -- I cannot think what else could be meant -- on the territory of the Soviet Union in this regard and before general and complete disarmament is achieved. That was one of the initial measures which they then proposed and which I hope we shall shortly be discussing in other meetings of our Conference. I only introduce it here to show the illogicality of the Soviet position on this point. If they are willing to accept it in the one context, why will they not accept it in the other context, when so much more is at stake, as so many members have said here this morning?

At this point I would like to quote briefly from the remarks which the representative of India made yesterday. He commented, in this context, on the logicity of accepting inspection teams, and he said:

"Also, Mr. Zorin, speaking on 23 March in the Committee of the Whole, stated that the question of an agreement on the banning of nuclear weapon tests was a matter connected with the plan of disarmament ... If that view were accepted, it would follow that, as in the case of other disarmament measures, the agreement must provide for detailed verification and control measures." (ENDC/PV.13, page 36)

I thought those were very wise words. I think one cannot divorce this question altogether from the wider issue which we are considering in our Conference. But it does seem to me extremely strange that there is this very rigid attitude in regard to the question of inspection on this particular matter, if in fact the

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Soviet Union is willing to consider inspection in these other matters to which I have referred. So it seems to me that the whole argument about espionage is entirely artificial.

We have even asked whether the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept inspection teams composed largely of nationals of unaligned countries. But the Soviet Union, as I understand it, has even turned this down and has turned it down flatly. It seems that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept that anyone in the world outside the Soviet bloc would be impartial and would be prepared to serve the aims of a test ban treaty loyally and with disinterest. I find this an especially discouraging fact, and one on which we cannot give up all hope of some change of heart on the part of the Soviet Union.

I turn now to another point. The Soviet representatives are now arguing that an international system of verification is no longer necessary because existing systems of detection are quite adequate to verify observance of a treaty. The representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, dealt with this point at some length and very fully yesterday. The position is, quite frankly, that the Western nations just do not agree with the Soviet thesis. Our views, briefly, amount to this. We do think that larger explosions in the atmosphere can be detected and identified. We do think that some earthquakes can be detected and identified -- but only some, and only in certain circumstances. One of these circumstances is the existence of an effective international detection system. We do think that the majority of underground nuclear events can be detected, but we do not think that underground nuclear events can be identified. If an event is detected, we say it is necessary to inspect it in order to identify it.

There is, as members will see, a fundamental difference between the question of detection and the question of identification. If an event is detected and is suspected of being a nuclear event, but no inspection is carried out to identify it, then the suspicion remains and that suspicion may lead to unfortunate decisions.

The Soviet Union, as I understand it, disagrees with this position. The Soviet Union says that recent evidence shows that existing systems not only can detect but also can identify. We have asked them to produce the evidence so that we can discuss it. I do not think that is an unreasonable request to put forward. We have asked them to let Soviet scientists sit round the table with Western scientists to see whether they can reach agreement. They have refused. What are we to make of this?

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

This brings me to one of the really basic points of our argument. It is the question of what would happen under a treaty that did not provide for an impartial check of an event which was detected and which could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion. What would happen if there was a dispute? This question has been posed a number of times in this Conference. If countries of the world are to sign a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests for ever, what is the sanction against a breach of the treaty? There is only one possible sanction, namely, that if one party to the treaty breaks the treaty by starting to test again, the other parties are then free to do the same. But if there is no international inspection, there is no means of checking an accusation. If any country, as the Soviet Union proposes, can say, "My national detection system has detected a breach of the treaty and, without any impartial international verification, I am therefore free to resume testing", then the treaty is really worthless. Any country can start testing again at any time, on its own initiative.

Impartial international inspection is the only real safeguard against this; and I have detected a very real degree of unanimity among delegations round this table on this particular point. We have repeatedly asked representatives of the Soviet Union what would happen under their proposals if one country accused another of a breach of the treaty. The only answer we have received is that there might be an exchange of data and consultation between the governments concerned. But this does not meet the basic difficulty. By the time consultation had taken place, the traces, if these were necessary to establish the fact, might have vanished. Over and beyond this, it would be the word of one side against the other. That is no solution in a matter of this kind.

We have also heard it argued that other international treaties have been signed without provision for international verification. But this, I must say -- and I say it with all respect -- has nothing to do with the situation we are considering here. We are not considering here a treaty banning, for example, aggression, in which the aggressor would be obvious to the whole world; we are considering here a treaty which could be violated in secret unless there were some form of impartial check. That is the fundamental difference, and it really cannot be ignored.

Here I would like to turn to what the representative of Burma said in the opening speech of this debate, because I thought, if he will forgive me for saying so, that he was absolutely right, and I did so agree with him. In

particular I might quote the following part of his statement:

"What happens in the case of a dispute as to the facts of a particular event? It may be said that there could be no dispute, because all national systems involved would give the same result. But we are not sure that this answers the question. After all, however good they may be, the instruments which record the events do not get up and speak." (ENDC/PV.13, page 7)

I thought that a very revealing, a very effective, phrase. Mr. Barrington continued:

"What they do is to record data which trained personnel interpret. It is therefore not inconceivable that interpretations may differ. How would a difference of this kind be resolved unless there were in existence some impartial international scientific body acceptable to all the nuclear Powers whose function would be to settle such disputes, if necessary after making such enquiries and inspections as may be considered by it to be essential?" (Ibid.)

I thought that really summed up the position extremely well, and I commend those wise words to my colleagues.

I should not quote only what Mr. Barrington said in our favour. It is only fair to recall that when he was arguing about the Western position he said this:

"Might not a less elaborate international system, perhaps omitting control posts from the territories of those who object to them, but with the right of conducting an agreed number of properly safeguarded on-site inspections by the international control organ, serve all our purposes just as well?" (Ibid., page 8)

It might -- we should have to consider such matters --; but the whole point is that one cannot reach such a position unless all the States parties to these negotiations accept the principle of on-site inspection, because that is the fundamental point, and until we can agree on it I do not see how we can make progress.

I noted also that our Ethiopian colleague referred yesterday to what his own Foreign Minister had said -- they were very wise words, I thought -- and he quoted, what Mr. Krishna Menon had said in the general debate. All of those suggestions, as I understand them, do involve the principle of on-site inspection.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

It is the adamant refusal of the Soviet Union to accept this principle which makes all discussion of the kind of verification to be applied really academic. I do therefore say to my colleagues that this point is the key to the whole thing.

We appreciate, also, the motives which inspired the suggestions made yesterday by our Swedish colleague. We are well aware of the special skill and knowledge in the field of seismic and nuclear studies which exist in Sweden, and we particularly value suggestions from that country. We consider what he said about a network of international scientific detection posts to be especially interesting. We think it deserves careful study and reflection.

We are also in general agreement with what he said about an international scientific processing agency which, if I understood him aright, would be responsible for the initiation and conduct of the inspection of any unidentified event.

What I am not quite so clear about is whether he was suggesting that signature of a test ban treaty would involve acceptance of the principle of international inspection, because, as I said a moment ago, this is the focal point of the problem. The difficulties which are upsetting the discussions in the Sub-Committee all centre around this particular point. The two other partners in the discussion are prepared to accept any form of international inspection. The Soviet Union refuses to accept any. We have made various **alternative** proposals for the form which international inspection could take. We have shown ourselves flexible on this point, as we have on others, but if the Soviet Union persists in returning an absolute "No" to any form of international verification we cannot see how we can follow up these helpful suggestions made not only by the representative of Sweden but also by the representatives of India, Burma and Ethiopia, and the suggestion we have heard this morning from the representatives of Mexico and the United Arab Republic.

I thought the following statement by the representative of Mexico was very significant:

"Acceptance of the principle of a minimum of international verification would provide a guarantee against unjustified doubts and suspicions..."

As I understood him, he was then thinking in the wider sphere, in relation to disarmament as a whole. How much I agree! I believe that if we could solve this problem in this particular context it would help us tremendously in our wider consideration of all the problems of disarmament. I do therefore agree very much with that.



(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Our colleague from Czechoslovakia referred once more to the offer made on 3 September by President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan, and he also reminded us that the Soviet draft agreement included a moratorium on underground tests. I feel I am bound to remind him again -- as I reminded some of our colleagues in previous discussion -- of the response which we received to that appeal, because I think this is very significant. In regard to the United Kingdom-United States proposal, Mr. Khrushchev himself said the following in the statement dated 9 September 1961:

"This is not the first attempt of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to restrict prohibition of atomic weapons tests to those conducted in the atmosphere. For example, they introduced a proposal similar to the present one in 1959. Why did the Soviet Government oppose, and why does it continue to oppose, this approach to the problem of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests? The reason is that to agree to discontinue only one sort of test -- in the atmosphere -- would ill serve the cause of peace. Such an agreement would amount to a fraud on the peoples. It could engender among them the harmful and dangerous illusion that steps were being taken to discontinue the arms race whereas in reality nothing of the kind was being done. In fact, governments would be continuing, so to speak, under legalized arrangements to improve their existing designs of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and for this purpose would be using underground tests, including tests for so-called peaceful purposes, and tests in outer space. Moreover, there would remain the possibility of constructing, on the basis of the data obtained from these experiments, new and yet more destructive types of nuclear weapons. Of course, military circles in the States members of NATO would merely rub their hands with glee, since they very well know that the fulfilment of this plan would bring grist to the mill of the NATO bloc -- the potential aggressor." (GEN/DNT/121, page 3)

I will not comment on those last words. I think that this quotation shows the reply we got and, of course, it shows the danger in a ban related to one particular environment. Therefore, we find it rather strange to see the Soviet Union bringing back this other proposal in which, admittedly, it has linked outer space, under water and atmospheric -- all of them without any proper provisions for detection or inspection -- but in which it has proposed a moratorium

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

on underground tests, so that, in fact, there would be no guarantee in relation to underground tests. And what better authority could I quote than Mr. Khrushchev in pointing to the dangers of unpoliced underground tests?

I found Mr. Zorin's arguments yesterday not terribly convincing, on the whole. I was particularly puzzled by the fact that he supported his arguments at one point by reference to the Bonn news agency, the D.P.A., reporting views in Washington. This seemed to be a somewhat roundabout way to get the facts. I am sure he is aware that the Western press is entirely free in these matters and that certainly the Western governments are not responsible for views which are expressed in the Western press. Indeed, there are several of those views with which I think it would be very difficult to agree. If Mr. Zorin had to take such a roundabout way to find a point, he must have been terribly short of points -- even from the press.

But perhaps I might respond in like vein. I have a rather interesting quotation from Pravda, which I do not think has quite the same freedom as the Western press. I quote from Pravda of 1 April:

"When the West demands the right to send inspectors at short notice to any part of the Soviet Union on the pretext that the Pentagon has registered a suspicious event, it can be assumed that the areas will be these where the C.I.A. thinks there are important strategic objectives. If the Pentagon discovered where Soviet rocket-launching sites are situated, they would want to deliver a first blow at them."

As I have said, Pravda is a newspaper of a country where I do not think there is quite the same freedom of the press as in the West, so I would assume that this expresses Government policy. Now, if that is really what the Soviet Government thinks, there must be some genuine misunderstanding. Perhaps when we get back to our discussions in the Sub-Committee, we can clear this up. If this is what the Soviet Government really thinks, then no wonder it is suspicious of inspection teams and of observation posts. But I can assure them that this is not at all the position, and that what we have proposed is very different from that. I hope this will be some comfort to our Soviet colleagues and that we may be able to make progress in the Sub-Committee when we clear up that point.

I apologize for detaining the Committee so long, but there were certain points which I felt necessary to bring to its attention. I would conclude by asking the Soviet Union -- and I ask this in all sincerity -- to be as flexible and as willing to negotiate as we and our United States colleagues so demonstrably are.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Perhaps I could put to Mr. Zorin three simple questions -- three questions only -- which require very simple answers:

First, does the Soviet Union really offer us no hope of any form of international inspection of any unidentified events in the Soviet Union, in any circumstances, short of the achievement of complete and general disarmament?

Secondly, does the Soviet Union reject, on grounds of espionage, the presence of unaligned nations on a visiting inspection team? If so, why do they so reject it?

Thirdly, is the Soviet Union unwilling either to furnish us with any information about possible means of improving detection and identification systems or to allow their scientists to undertake joint discussion of the matter with our scientists?

I ask those three simple questions. If we could get clear answers to them, I think it could help us in the continuation of our efforts. As we have been reminded this morning, all our colleagues are urging us to proceed and conclude an agreement. But that cannot be done on the basis of Western concessions alone. We have made many concessions; the evidence is there and I will not repeat it. I ask our Soviet colleagues to respond in the same way and to help us to reach agreement.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The problem of the cessation of nuclear tests now has an extremely grave international context. These tests are an imminent danger to the peoples of the whole world. They are themselves research for the improvement of weapons of mass destruction; they are actually the nuclear armaments race which is constantly increasing the imminent danger of catastrophe for mankind.

We all know these statements are true: they are backed by the enlightened opinions of scientists who well know what they are talking about, and by the urgent appeals of statesmen and representatives of public opinion in all countries for the cessation of nuclear tests.

I do not wish to load this short summary with quotations, but I cannot refrain from submitting some of these opinions and some of these urgent appeals expressing the unanimous desire of the peoples of the whole world to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests.

However, before doing so I should like to mention that the United Kingdom representative declared in his speech today that he agreed with very many of the

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remarks made by the representatives of certain countries, particularly of the United Arab Republic. It should be stated that all these attitudes of neutral countries re-stated yesterday and today by different speakers had already been expressed in earlier statements by the representatives of those countries, for the United Kingdom representative also meant that he agreed with the opinions which had been expressed.

In his speech of 21 March Mr. Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, said:

"To a country like mine it hardly makes any difference on what basis agreement is reached and on which plan such agreement is reached in order to stop atomic tests. It makes absolutely no difference to my country. The main thing is that the tests should actually be stopped. The world would not forgive us and we should not forgive ourselves if we allowed any more tests under any pretext and for any reason whatsoever to take place again." (ENDC/PV.6, page 13)

But when the United Kingdom representative continued his statement, he maintained his earlier position, which he described as flexible but which will lead, if maintained, to the execution of nuclear tests that will unleash a new nuclear armaments race, which this time nothing could stop but a new nuclear war. In this context, which some representatives of the Western Powers state that they accept, Mr. Krishna Menon dealt at length with nuclear tests on 20 March in the general discussion, in order to express the unanimous wish of the people of India and of its Prime Minister:

"We have not the full report of the Prime Minister's speech in Parliament yesterday. He makes there a very fervent appeal to all nations not to commit themselves to explosions while this Conference is sitting. He said 'I would beg of the Great Powers to consider not having any tests while the Geneva Conference is sitting'."

(ENDC/PV.5, page 37)

I simply beg leave to point out that in all the statements made on this subject one single thought and one absolute requirement stands out: the need to bring about cessation of nuclear tests of all sorts. That is the unanimous wish of humanity: to be freed from this menace which symbolizes, and so to speak foreshadows, the worst catastrophe that ever threatened it in its whole history. But, just when we are striving here to agree on a draft treaty for general and

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complete disarmament, our Conference is menaced with paralysis by the following two moves. First, the end of April has been fixed by the United States for the resumption of nuclear tests. The President of the United States said in his speech of 2 March 1962 that he had instructed "the Atomic Energy Commission and the Ministry of Defence to conduct a series of nuclear tests beginning in the latter part of April and to be concluded as quickly as possible". I do not think it would be easy for anyone to imagine the situation, at the very least a paradox, which would be created here within this Committee if it had to continue discussing the cessation of nuclear tests amid explosions over the Pacific. For this reason we share the anxiety of the representative of Burma, who said yesterday that over and above all other considerations relating to nuclear tests we must bear in mind the effect which the resumption of these tests would have on this Conference and on the disarmament question itself. This same anxiety has been expressed by Mr. Green, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Returning to Ottawa from Geneva, he said as he left his plane that "the resumption of nuclear tests by the United States would be a very serious reverse for the Disarmament Conference."

The second move is the attitude adopted by the United States Government and delegation towards the cessation of nuclear tests. It subordinates any agreement to a control of the sort the United States and its allies have in mind, which the head of the United States delegation described yesterday as essential. By the questions which the United Kingdom representative asked today, he has associated himself fully with that control and has shown how inflexible his position is. Here we have a point which deserves attention. The United States representative asked in his speech yesterday: "Why do we speak of the need for control, and why are we convinced that it must be internationally arranged? Why would not a mere paper pledge without any international controls, of the type which the Soviet Union is now proposing, be sufficient?" (ENDC/PV.13, page 11)

We seem to have here an ambiguity, or rather several ambiguities. In the first place, an international agreement drawn up after discussion within an international organ cannot be compared to a paper obligation -- that is to say, as the speaker meant, a scrap of paper. Secondly, control exercised by the existing national means, whatever they are, would not thereby be less international. More than that, it would quite clearly, by its very nature, be organized on the widest international scale. It would admittedly be applied by national means, but by the countries concerned, whose number, we cannot doubt, would be equal to the total number of countries in the group.

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Several speakers have stated that the object of control would be to create among the nations confidence that the agreement would be strictly carried out by the signatories. Do they imagine that a country which has signed an agreement embodying a control exercised by a great number of interested countries and by world opinion would assume less responsibility than if inspection on the spot were prescribed? It is self-evident that no Power would venture to flout the world and incur its opprobrium by fraudulently violating a treaty.

The problem of inspection must therefore obviously have a very different value for those who make it a major obstacle to an agreement for cessation of nuclear tests.

In that context I should like to broach another problem which we feel likely to increase the confusion. Clearly, the obstacle represented by control -- that is to say, by inspection -- overshadows the whole problem of cessation of nuclear tests. Now, as the representative of the Soviet Union showed yesterday, this problem is raised by several classes of tests: (1) in the atmosphere, (2) in outer space, (3) under water, and (4) underground.

I will not repeat the demonstration which the Soviet Union representative gave yesterday. But I cannot help recalling that the nuclear tests which for military purposes are far more important than the rest, both in volume and in the part they play in the armaments race, are precisely those in the first three classes I have just enumerated. These are the three classes of tests which are perfectly detectable by national means. Thus there remain the underground tests. The American experts themselves say that tests in this class have less military value and are also very costly. Moreover, they can easily be detected, and even for the most part identified, by the means now available. A corroborating fact is that during the voluntary nuclear-test moratorium of 1958-61 neither party had cause to complain that the other had conducted nuclear tests.

The form of the nuclear test problem and its importance for the work of our Committee on general and complete disarmament raise an insistent question. Is it possible, in the situation which has arisen, to solve this problem and to take the next step towards our main objective of general and complete disarmament? The Bulgarian delegation firmly believes that the Soviet Government's declaration of 27 November 1961 answers this question in the affirmative. That declaration proposes, as everyone here will recall, the conclusion of "an appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water,

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and in outer space, that is, in those environments where an implementation of control is not fraught with any serious technical difficulties" (ENDC/11, page 5).

The Soviet declaration goes on: "In regard to underground nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that States should undertake not to conduct such tests until agreement is reached on a system of control over underground explosions as a constituent part of an international system of control over the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament." (Ibid.)

In face of this position, what was and what is still the attitude of the United States? President Kennedy declared in his speech, already quoted, of 2 March 1962 that the United States would resume nuclear explosions in the atmosphere --- and perhaps in outer space --- towards the end of April. According to statements made by the President of the United States in this same speech, the United States has maintained superiority over the Soviet Union in nuclear power. So the United States does not need to undertake new tests in order to overtake the Soviet Union, for according to its own statements -- whether correct or not -- it is still stronger. Secondly, if the United States accepted the Soviet proposals now it would be risking absolutely nothing because, according to its own statements, it is the stronger.

On the other hand, what is worrying the American leaders is hypothetical Soviet tests. Here is what the President of the United States actually said about this: "In short, last fall's tests, in and by themselves, did not give the Soviet Union superiority in nuclear power ... And I must report to you in all candour that further Soviet series, in the absence of further Western progress, could well provide the Soviet Union with a nuclear attack and defence capability so powerful as to encourage aggressive designs" (ENDC/13).

So it is on a mere supposition that there are to be new Soviet tests that the President of the United States has decided to resume nuclear tests at the end of April. That is difficult to believe, just when the Soviet Union has proposed the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests and of a draft treaty for general and complete disarmament under international control. It is even more difficult to understand this reasoning based on a mere supposition that there will be new Soviet tests, a supposition which, in view of the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a treaty for the immediate cessation of tests, is totally without foundation.

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Is it really possible that, because of a mere supposition, mankind must face more American tests in the atmosphere during April -- tests which without any doubt would inevitably entail more tests by the Soviet Union? Does it not seem frightful that the world should, on a mere supposition, be dragged once again into the spiral, the race, of tests and nuclear armaments? It is even less understandable since we have the statement -- whether accurate or not, as I have said -- of the President of the United States that his country is superior in nuclear armaments.

In his speech of 2 March President Kennedy continued: "The information from our last series of atmospheric tests in 1958 has all been analysed and re-analysed. It cannot tell us more without new data". (Ibid.)

That being so, and after the analyses and counter-analyses of the United States' last series of nuclear tests, mankind would never be able to understand why the United States should undertake a new series of tests just when the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament is sitting. Do certain circles consider that to be the best atmosphere in which our Committee can sit?

We believe that the information in President Kennedy's speech of 2 March, and in certain statements made by the Western representatives to the Sub-Committee instructed to study the question of a treaty for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, should lead the United States to adopt an attitude permitting immediate cessation of experimental explosions. The world would certainly never understand why the United States, which declares it has superiority in nuclear armaments, has carried out all the analyses and counter-analyses and, so to speak, drawn its conclusions, should not stop there. All the peoples of the world anxiously expect the Eighteen Nation Committee to end the armaments race, draw up a treaty for general and complete disarmament, and, above all, immediately to stop nuclear weapons tests which might again drag the world into the endless spiral of the armaments race.

At this moment all eyes are turned towards the United States, towards its most responsible politicians, towards its leaders. Their duty is to remove every imaginary obstacle, every hypothetical and unfounded suspicion, in order to prepare the ground for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. We are certain that a favourable climate would then immediately be created for the work of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, and the whole international situation would be improved.



The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): There are still three names on the list of speakers for today, and our time is running out. I propose to call upon the representative of Brazil next. I think that after he has spoken it would probably meet the convenience of the Committee if we were to adjourn until tomorrow. The proposal originally had been that we should get back to the discussion of general and complete disarmament tomorrow, but I have had some consultation with the co-Chairmen and I understand it would be agreeable to them if the two remaining speeches, which will be those of the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, could be heard tomorrow, as the first business, before we go on to discuss general and complete disarmament.

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): I am sorry to prolong the meeting by speaking at this late hour. I have nothing very important or original to say, but I think it necessary for every representative present to defend his country's position and explain it clearly.

I have listened with the greatest interest, since yesterday, to the speakers who have addressed the Committee. I am the fourteenth to speak on this question, and I note that the previous speakers include six representatives of what are called non-aligned or uncommitted States -- the States which have more recently been invited to take part in discussing the problems of general and complete disarmament. Like them, I wish to begin by saying that it is most regrettable that the representatives of the three nuclear Powers have not yet reached an understanding on some common basis for an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

I have listened with the keenest interest to the different statements made here, and I have noticed that they deal mainly with the most important technical aspects of the problem. We have heard a brilliant technical discussion, but despite the very clear statement made on the subject by Mr. Dean, the United States representative, I wonder whether the question is solely a technical one. I should be more inclined to take the view of other speakers that the discussion is also based on quite solid and understandable political considerations.

After all, we are in rather the same situation as the one I witnessed thirty years ago. I apologise for speaking about myself, but I should like to offer testimony which may perhaps be taken into consideration. Thirty years ago I was a young adviser on the Brazilian delegation to another disarmament conference

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meeting at Geneva. On that occasion, too, days and weeks were lost in discussing the technical aspects of disarmament. If I remember rightly, at that time the main problem was to overcome the difficulty of defining offensive weapons and defensive weapons. Some very brilliant speakers, renowned statesmen who were leading the delegations of the most powerful countries in the world, such as Mr. MacDonald for the United Kingdom, Mr. Tardieu for France, Mr. Grandi for Italy, Mr. Litnov for the Soviet Union, took part in the debates. We heard it demonstrated, most aptly and wisely, that the question was a strictly technical one and that it was essential first of all to remove all doubts about the offensive or defensive nature of the weapons existing at that time. That situation rather reminds me of our situation today, for we are losing our way in considerations, however brilliant and pertinent they may be, concerning the technical aspects of the problem before us.

I must say, however, that despite the doubts and technical difficulties one can sense a state of mind -- predominant I might say -- which entertains some hope that this problem may be, if not settled, at least shelved, and that it may be possible to return to the path of understanding and political negotiation. For, after all, that is precisely what we need to do.

Since 1955, when the problem of nuclear tests first attracted world attention after the American explosion on the Pacific island of Bikini and in consequence of the results of that explosion and its effects on certain Japanese nationals who had approached the area despite the warnings previously given by the United States Government, we have several times witnessed a kind of back-and-forth movement which seems to us to be growing more dangerous every day: there is one group which tests and another which protests. Then the group that has protested begins to test, and the group that has tested begins to protest. It is amidst this conjugation of the verbs "to test" and "to protest" that over the years we have watched the growth of the threat that is hanging over us and causing anxiety to all of us, the unarmed countries. I say "unarmed", because there is a real difference between the countries which were formerly called "disarmed" and those which are now called "unarmed". A country can be armed in a certain relative sense, if it has conventional armaments, but still remain unarmed because it is not in control of nuclear power.

As I had occasion to point out when I was head of the Brazilian delegation to the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, there is now a group

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of three countries which are really armed -- the nuclear Powers -- engaged in negotiations and in very learned discussions which we attend with the greatest interest. Yet these three armed Powers hold in their hands the fate of all the other unarmed Powers. It is on behalf of a particular group of those unarmed Powers -- the group of countries which it is agreed to call non-aligned because they are not parties to any military treaty such as the North Atlantic Treaty or the Warsaw Treaty -- that I wish to express most emphatically in the name of my delegation, my Government and the people of Brazil, my sincere endorsement of all the comments that have been made here and all the hopes that have been voiced by those who have taken their seats beside us round this conference table.

As Mr. Padilla Nervo has just recalled with such clarity and force, at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly we too voted in favour of all the resolutions aimed at preventing and prohibiting the continuance of nuclear tests. Of course, we did not believe that any of those resolutions in itself exhausted the subject or could suffice to solve the problem. But, like the Mexican delegation, the Brazilian delegation wished to state and maintain its support for all the proposals in that sense -- those submitted by Ireland, by Sweden, by India, and the proposal which emerged from the joint effort of various African and Asian States, calling for the denuclearization of Africa.

It was in the same spirit and with the same purpose that the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the statement he made here on Friday, 16 March, said: "Brazil expressed its disapproval in the most unequivocal terms when the Soviet Union, in October last year, conducted a series of such tests, thereby assuming responsibility for reopening technical competition when an encouraging truce had prevailed since 1958. Similarly, Brazil expressed the hope that the still conditional decision of the United States of America to resume such tests would not be carried out. There are two reasons which compel us to adopt an attitude of inflexible opposition and express condemnation towards these tests: the first is the conviction that they, more than anything else, stimulate the attempt to secure temporary offensive or defensive superiority, which is an inevitable source of pressure for war in the State that is in the better position; the second is the fear of radioactive contamination of the biosphere, which gradually reduces the margin of tolerance and endangers not so much the present, but the future of the human race. Considering that at the present stage of technology the use of nuclear energy even for peaceful purposes leaves a residue

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which must reduce this inextensible margin, it is easy to see the significance of such competitive tests, having regard to our duty to future generations."

(ENDC/IV.3, pp. 8 and 9)

It is true that the problems that have been raised here concerning the possibility of control are extremely knotty, delicate and difficult. The political position of my country and my delegation is, first, that we are in favour of international control in all negotiations and in the treaties which may ensue on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Secondly, we are opposed to the resumption of nuclear tests, whether immediately or in a few months' time -- more precisely, in April or in June -- which, according to conversations that have come to my knowledge, are the times when these tests will very probably take place.

Our position is therefore clear: we are against the resumption of nuclear tests on either side. And we really believe that to restore confidence in the possibility of implementing a treaty prohibiting further nuclear tests, the idea of international control must be accepted. On this point, too, I should like to repeat what was said by our Minister for Foreign Affairs: "Here, I should like to recall the words of Mr. Jules Moch, the representative of France -- a country whose absence from this Committee is regrettable -- applying them specifically to nuclear tests: 'No disarmament without control; no control without disarmament; but all the disarmament that can be controlled.'" (ENDC/IV.3, p. 9)

Of course I do not intend, at this hour, to go into the subtleties and the specific difficulties of the question of control. I merely wish to make a few comments of a general, political nature, which may perhaps be taken into consideration by those who are listening.

The socialist countries, in explaining their refusal to accept control, give as the main reason the presumption that on-site inspection may become a means of espionage. At the same time, to show the soundness of their position regarding the possibility of accepting a treaty without control, the delegations of the socialist countries stress the fact -- of which the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs today gave us a very timely reminder -- that a treaty must be based on the principle -- one of the few traditional principles of international law -- that pacta sunt servanda, in other words, that treaties must be respected. But -- and this is the general comment I wished to make -- if the idea of control is rejected, thus clearly showing lack of trust, on the pretext that all control presupposes espionage, how can we accept the idea of a treaty based on trust --

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a treaty the violation of which would bring shame and dishonour on the guilty country?

It is clear that in those two thoughts, or that line of thought, there is an obvious contradiction. If the treaty is called for as evidence of trust, how can control be refused on grounds of distrust?

Thus we have not yet really understood why it has not been possible to reach a higher stage of negotiation that would really remove these difficulties which, after all, may perhaps be purely subsidiary or may have political causes rather than underlying technical or even logical reasons.

We therefore most sincerely support the appeals and statements made here on the possibility of resuming negotiations, which would obviously call for flexibility on both sides, that is to say the possibility of the socialist countries accepting the principle of international control and the possibility of the western Powers accepting the fact that international control is not confined to the form of control which they consider effective. In other words, I am saying that there could be international control which was not exactly that proposed in the American plan or in the brilliant statements made here by the distinguished delegates of the great Powers of the West. I should like to refer especially to the outstanding speech made today by our Chairman, Mr. Godber.

We might take the Swedish plan, for instance. I do not say that a Swedish plan or proposal actually exists, but there is a Swedish suggestion, there have been talks with the Swedish representatives in which they have explained rather than proposed, or perhaps suggested, possibilities of agreement based on the formation of a kind of international body which would not have the quasi-judicial powers unacceptable in certain quarters, which would perhaps not even have the status of an arbitral body -- that might be too much at this stage of the negotiations -- but would none the less be a body which could be trusted, since it would be constituted on a technical and, above all, an impartial basis, not representing exclusively the views of the scientists of the two blocs.

I do not say that we should accept precisely this proposal. Here I support the view so eloquently expressed by the representative of Mexico: it is one suggestion, but there will be others. The one thing that we really cannot do is to reject the possibility of other solutions; above all, we cannot agree not to try to find another solution. We cannot agree, as the representative of Mexico so aptly said, to be impotent witnesses of a race we have been watching

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not merely for ten years, but for thirty years, perhaps ever since the Treaty of Versailles. It is a race which, in the last analysis, is due mainly to a position I would describe as more than political: it is a matter of political philosophy, based on the question whether security lies in armament or in disarmament. We know that discussion. It goes back to the old League of Nations and to the Treaty of Versailles: it has its origin much longer ago in what the old international law called "the balance of power". It comes from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That is always the way. Security lies in armaments and armed blocs: the blocs arm themselves more and more heavily and the consequence is disaster, catastrophe, ruin, war. But now we are faced with a situation that has no precedent in history, for the ruin will be total, the disaster will be total, the war will be total.

I raise my voice here, in the name of my delegation, as we did when the question was voted upon in the General Assembly.

I am sure that we may have hope. I am sure of it, because both the non-aligned or so-called non-aligned countries and the countries belonging to the two great military blocs of the world have expressed such hope. I refer to the eminent representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, who spoke yesterday of this hope in connexion with the possibility of resuming negotiations. I refer to Mr. Tarabanov who only today spoke on behalf of Bulgaria to the same effect. I also wish to refer to the heads of the delegations of the three nuclear Powers themselves, who have spoken on similar lines. I was most impressed by the objectivity and the political content of the statements made by Mr. Dean, Mr. Zorin and Mr. Godber.

I thank you for the attention you have been kind enough to give to my statement at this late hour. I should really like to dwell not so much on an appeal -- which would be something subjective or even lyrical -- as on hope: for hope can sometimes remain even after trust has gone. Hope does not always follow closely on trust. Hope is something that may rise above trust. Sometimes we lose trust without losing hope. It is speaking on behalf of my country's delegation and following with great respect the opinions which have been expressed here in the same sense by eminent representatives of the eight-Power group -- the representatives of Burma, Ethiopia, India, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Mexico -- that I wish to offer these considerations and this hope.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I still have two names on the list of speakers and, as I indicated earlier, the representatives concerned have agreed to defer their statements until tomorrow.

As I indicated when I spoke before, I think it will be reasonable to close the list of speakers at that point. Of course, there would be nothing to prevent any representative from speaking again on points of clarification or correction after those two speeches have been made. I know there is a desire to move ahead as soon as possible to the discussion of general and complete disarmament, and I understand we shall proceed with that tomorrow at the conclusion of this debate.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its fourteenth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. J.B. Godber, Minister of State and representative of the United Kingdom.

"The representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United Arab Republic, Romania, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Brazil made statements.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 4 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

